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Alternatives to Entanglement
By DAvID E. STEINBERG*
INTRODUCTION
As interpreted in United States Supreme Court decisions, the
First Amendment Establishment Clause proscribes laws that "foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."" This en-
tanglement doctrine has become a lightning rod for critical com-
mentary, drawing condemnation from both justices and scholars.
2
Nonetheless, the Court has demonstrated a continuing commitment
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Research assistants Heather J. Harner, Amy B. Kubisiak, Janet V. Northey, and Sean
P. Roman all made significant contributions to this Article. The author very much appre-
ciates their fine work.
Generous research funding provided by the University of Pittsburgh helped to make
this Article possible.
I See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). In Lemon, the Court adopted a three-part test for
Establishment Clause cases. A statute does not offend the clause if (1) the statute has a
secular purpose, (2) the statute's principal or primary effect does not advance or inhibit
religion, and (3) the statute does not foster excessive entanglement of government and
religion. See id. at 612-13.
Leading discussions of the entanglement doctrine include Edward M. Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980); Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement
Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. Ry. 1195 (1980).
1 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I
adhere to doubts about the entanglement test.... ."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-
10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the entanglement test); Roemer v. Maryland
Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(describing the entanglement doctrine as "at once both insolubly paradoxical" and "a
blurred, indistinct, variable barrier"). Law review criticisms of the entanglement doctrine
include Gaffney, supra note 1, at 230; Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Consti-
tution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VML. L.
REv. 3, 19 (1979) ("The entanglement part of the Court's triad is either empty or nonsen-
sical."); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Court's Approach, 72 CoaRNLL L. Ray. 905, 932 (1987) (arguing that the entanglement
doctrine "should be eliminated").
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to an entanglement inquiry.3 This Article argues that the Court
should end its commitment to the entanglement prong, because the
Court's entanglement inquiry is not coherent and conflicts with
established constitutional principles.
Part I of this Article reviews the development of two different
entanglement elements, neither of which has received a- satisfactory
justification or description. Administrative entanglement, the first
element of the entanglement prong, proscribes certain ongoing
relationships between religious organizations and government rep-
resentatives. The Court has developed no methodology for distin-
guishing permissible church-state interactions from impermissible
administrative entanglement. The Court's administrative entangle-
ment rulings appear hopelessly contradictory. The second element
of the entanglement doctrine proscribes church-state relationships
likely to result in "political divisiveness related to religious belief."' 4
The Justices have provided few or no clues for identifying those
state programs that suggest such political divisiveness.
Part II asserts that the entanglement doctrine conflicts with
established constitutional principles. First, while the Court has
I See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2373
(1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14.
During the coming term, the Justices may reconsider not only the entanglement test,
but much of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. On March 18, 1991, the Court
granted certiorari in Lee v. Weisman, - U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991). In an amicus
curiae brief, the United States has encouraged the Justices to "replace" the Lemon test,
previously employed in Establishment Clause cases, with a "liberty-focused principle." See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7, Lee v. Weisman,
No. 90-1014 (May 1991) (pending before Supreme Court) (copy on file with the author).
The entanglement doctrine forms one part of the three-part Lemon test.
The Weisman case challenges a prayer reading at a Rhode Island graduation. In June
1989, Rabbi Leslie Gutterman read an invocation and benediction during graduation cere-
monies at the Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public junior high school in Providence,
Rhode Island. Rabbi Gutterman's benediction "opened with an appeal to a God, asked
God's blessings, gave thanks to a Lord, and concluded with 'Amen."' Weisman v. Lee,
728 F. Supp. 68, 69-70 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, - U.S.
,111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
The Rhode Island federal district court held that this prayer reading violated the
Establishment Clause. See id. at 71-75. In a two-paragraph majority opinion, the First
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1090 (Ist
Cir. 1990); see also id. at 1090-97 (Bownes, J., concurring). But see id. at 1097-99 (Campbell,
J., dissenting).
Although the United States has asked the Justices to replace the Lemon test, the
government's Weisman brief lacks any extended critique of this test. In fact, the government
does not even describe the three-part Lemon inquiry. Instead, the amicus curiae brief
focuses on history and precedent supporting the argument that the Rhode Island prayer
reading did not violate the Establishment Clause.
4 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
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guarantied broad rights to political access under a variety of con-
stitutional provisions, the entanglement doctrine discourages polit-
ical participation by religious organizations and discourages political
debate on religious issues. Second, the prohibition on political
divisiveness conflicts with the First Amendment protection ac-
corded political speech. Third, because the entanglement doctrine
primarily affects those religious groups that endorse political activ-
ism, this doctrine results in religious discrimination.
Part III considers three alternative Establishment Clause models
that do not rely on the entanglement doctrine. First, the Court
could return to a secular purpose-primary effect model. Second,
the Court could develop an Establishment Clause doctrine focusing
on religious coercion. Third, the Court could adopt a classification
model of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, similar to that used
in Equal Protection Clause cases.
I. THE UNCLEAR BoUNDARms OF T ENTANGLEMENT DocTINE
During the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has begun almost
every Establishment Clause opinion in a predictable fashion:
First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion ... finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion." 5
Despite its familiarity, the entanglement doctrine is of relatively
recent origins.6 In fact, entanglement was not treated as an inde-
pendent Establishment Clause concern until 1970.
7
1 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S. -, 109
S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989) ("This trilogy of tests has been applied regularly in the Court's
later Establishment Clause cases.").
In the pending Lee v. Weisman case, the United States has asked the Supreme Court
to replace the Lemon test. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (May 1991) (pending before Supreme Court)
(copy on file with the author). At one point, the government concludes: "(A] majority of
the members of the court, recognizing the confusion that Lemon has spawned, has on
separate occasions advocated significant revision or abandonment of the Lemon test." Id.
at 6 & n.4 (citing opinions by Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice White).
For a discussion of the Lee v. Weisman litigation, see supra note 3.
6 Some authors have suggested that First Amendment historical evidence does not
support the adoption of an entanglement test. See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 1, at 212-24.
7 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Prior to this date, the Court had
1991-92]
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The first suggestion of an entanglement doctrine came in Walz
v. Tax Commission.8 The New York City Tax Commission had
exempted property used for "religious, educational, or charitable
purposes" from property taxes.9 The Walz majority held that this
tax exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause. 10 In the
decision, the Court wrote for the first time that "an excessive
government entanglement with religion" would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause." Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion relied
on this entanglement doctrine to uphold the tax exemption, arguing
that elimination of the exemption "would tend to expand the
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church
property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations
and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes."' 12
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 3 the Court recognized that entangle-
ment inquiry is relevant to all Establishment Clause cases. The
Lemon opinion addressed Rhode Island and Pennsylvania pro-
grams that partially funded the salaries earned by private elemen-
tary and high school teachers, including teachers that worked in
sectarian schools.' 4 Again writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger concluded that the state programs violated the Establish-
ment Clause, solely because each statute resulted in "an excessive
entanglement between government and religion."' 5 The Court found
excessive entanglement for two reasons. First, both of the statutes
at issue authorized salary reimbursement only for the hours that
private school instructors spent teaching secular subjects. 6 Thus,
relied on a two-part test in Establishment Clause cases. The Court first would consider
whether the challenged statute followed from some secular legislative purpose. Upon iden-
tifying a secular purpose, the Court would examine whether the statute resulted in an
impermissible principal or primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. See,
e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); see also infra text accompanying notes 233-74
(reconsidering a secular purpose-primary effect model).
8 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see Ripple, supra note 1, at 1197 (noting the origins of the
entanglement doctrine in the Walz opinion).
9 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 666-67.
10 See id. at 667.
1 See id. at 674.
12 Id.
13 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
"4 See id. at 607. The Rhode Island program reviewed in Lemon involved only a
teacher salary supplement. The Pennsylvania statute also authorized reimbursement for
secular textbooks and instructional materials used by private schools. Id.
Is Id.
16 See id. at 608-09.
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the Court felt that administrative entanglement would result from
state monitoring undertaken to prevent state funding of lessons in
religious doctrine.1' State examination of sectarian school finances
also would result in administrative entanglement.18
The Lemon Court discussed a second and distinct entanglement
concern, which resulted from "the divisive political potential of
these state programs."' 19 While acknowledging that political debate
typically represents a "normal and healthy manifestation of our
democratic system of government," Chief Justice Burger wrote
that "political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to pro-
tect. '"20 The Court concluded that teacher salary supplements could
result in political divisiveness because use of state monies would
divide taxpayers into proponents and opponents of sectarian
schools. 21 Chief Justice Burger further asserted that the potential
for political divisiveness "is aggravated in these two statutory
programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations and
the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and popula-
tions grow."2 The Lemon decision thus identified two distinct
types of unconstitutional entanglement: 23 A statute or government
program might result in impermissible administrative entanglement
between the state and religion, and a law might promote imper-
missible political divisiveness along religious lines.
A. Administrative Entanglement
"Administrative entanglement" involves regular contacts be-
tween government and religion. Beyond this very general definition,
the Court has added little specific content to the term. An absolute
prohibition on all government contacts with religion would be
inappropriate and impossible to implement. As the Court has writ-
See id. at 619.
IS See id. at 620-21.
'+ Id. at 622.
- 0 Id. The Lemon opinion referred to an article by Paul Freund that previously had
suggested this political divisiveness concern. See id. (citing Paul Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 Hnv. L. Rnv. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
21 See id.
Id. at 623.
23 See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Pro-
tection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 No=B DAmE L. REv. 311, 345-
46 (1986) (distinguishing administrative entanglement and political divisiveness); see also
Ripple, supra note 1, at 1200-01.
1991-921
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ten, for example: "The Establishment Clause does not exempt
religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as
fire inspections and building and zoning regulations."'' Whether a
particular case involves administrative entanglement is almost im-
possible to predict because the Court's administrative entanglement
conclusions often appear inconsistent and arbitrary.
In Meek v. Pittenger," the Court emphasized the excessive
administrative entanglement resulting from a Pennsylvania program
that provided a variety of state support to parochial and private
schools. 26 The state had provided schools with funding for testing
services, counseling, textbook loans, and other instructional mate-
rials.27 The Court upheld the textbook loan program, 8 but struck
down almost all the other forms of state aid.29 The Court relied
heavily on an administrative entanglement argument to invalidate
the part of the Pennsylvania program that paid public school
teachers and counselors to work with private school students. 0 To
ensure that these public school personnel did not discuss religious
doctrine with students, the state would need to "engage in some
form of continuing surveillance" within the private schools. 3' Even
with such surveillance, a public school teacher or counselor might
"fail on occasion to separate religious instruction and the advance-
ment of religious beliefs from his secular educational responsibili-
ties. ' 32 Thus secular instruction and religious indoctrination could
become intertwined.
In Aguilar v. Felton,33 the Court invalidated a New York City
program that funded sectarian schools, again emphasizing admin-
istrative entanglement problems. 34 As in Meek, New York paid
public school teachers and counselors to provide services at paro-
chial and other private elementary and secondary schools. The
24 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985);
see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
-' 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
26 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1975).
See id. at 352-55.
n See id. at 359-62.
2 See id. at 362-73. But see id. at 371 n.21 (suggesting that the state might fund
"speech and hearing services" in private schools).
30 Under the challenged program, both exceptional and remedial students would have
received these services. See id. at 371.
31 Id. at 372.
32 Id. at 371.
33 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
3" See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
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schools receiving assistance under this program were attended by
educationally deprived students, living in low income areas.
35
The Court focused on the daily visits of school personnel to
sectarian school classrooms, stating that such repeated visits would
result in "a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian
schools receiving aid. ' 36 Unconstitutional administrative entangle-
ment was said to exist because "[a]dministrative personnel of the
public and parochial school systems must work together in resolv-
ing matters related to schedules, classroom assignments, [and]
problems that arise in the implementation of the program.1 37 Ad-
ditionally, city officials might impose regulations on sectarian
schools that conflicted with principles "of deep religious signifi-
cance to the controlling denominations.1
38
Despite Meek and Aguilar, the Court often has rejected ad-
ministrative entanglement arguments. For example, the Court up-
held government aid to church affiliated counseling programs in
Bowen v. Kendrick,39 a suit challenging the Adolescent Family Life
Act (the "AFLA"). 40 The purpose of the Act is to grant federal
funds to public and nonprofit private organizations that provide
unmarried adolescent women services relating to pregnancy and
childbirth. 41 In Kendrick, a number of recipients were "organiza-
tions with institutional ties to religious denominations.
'42
The AFLA seems to present the same types of church-state
relationships prohibited in Meek and Aguilar. Aguilar invalidated
a private school aid program that could result in secular influences
on religious institutions. Similarly, the AFLA provides for a review
of church counseling programs by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. 43 Both Meek and Aguilar had concluded that
11 Id. at 405-06. New York received the funding at issue in Aguilar from the federal
government, under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which
is currently codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2976 (1988). The Act authorizes Congress to
"provide financial assistance to State and local educational agencies to meet the special
needs of ... educationally deprived children at the preschool, elementary, and secondary
levels." Id. § 2701(a)(2)(A). State and local agencies have discretion in determining how to
spend these federal monies. Id. § 2701(a)(2)(C).
"Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 414.
39 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42 See id. § 300z; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1988).
I- Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 597.
41 See id. at 616-17 ("Unquestionably, the Secretary will review the programs set up
and run by the AFLA grantees, and undoubtedly this will involve a review of, for example,
the educational materials that a grantee proposes to use.").
1991-921
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regular contacts with religious institutions could improperly influ-
ence the beliefs and conduct of government employees. Yet, the
AFLA contemplates regular contacts because the Act requires gov-
ernment inspectors to evaluate church counseling programs and
expenditures."
Nevertheless, the Kendrick Court upheld the AFLA. The Justices
found that the AFLA did not result in administrative entanglement.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Kendrick majority,
stated: "[T]here is no reason to assume that the religious organi-
zations which may receive grants are 'pervasively sectarian' in the
same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be." 45
The Court similarly rejected an administrative entanglement
argument in Board of Education v. Mergens.46 Administrators at
an Omaha, Nebraska public school would not allow students to
establish a Christian club.47 The students challenged the denial of
their club application, relying in part on the Equal Access Act.48
The Equal Access Act prohibits public schools from denying facil-
ities to student groups "on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings. ' 49
In Mergens, the Court ruled that administrators could not
exclude student religious groups from the high school campus. In
reaching this result, the Court concluded that the Equal Access
Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. The majority opinion
gave little weight to the high school's administrative entanglement
argument. Even though the Act contemplated that public school
personnel might attend student religious group meetings for "cus-
todial purposes, ' 50 the Court concluded that "custodial oversight
... merely to ensure order and good behavior" would not "im-
permissibly entangle government in the day-to-day surveillance or
administration of religious activities." 5
The Mergens majority failed to justify its administrative entan-
glement conclusion. In Meek and Aguilar, the Court had expressed
" See id. at 617; see also id. at 651 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 616. But see id. at 625-26, 631-33, 635-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that direct evidence showed that some AFLA programs involved religious doctrine).
- U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
The administrators had concluded that religious group meetings in school facilities
would violate the Establishment Clause. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, - U.S.
110 S. Ct. 2356, 2362 (1990).
- 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
,9 Id. § 4071(a).
" Mergens, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2373 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2)).
51 Id.
[VCOL. 80
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concern that public school employees might begin teaching sectar-
ian doctrine at some point during their repeated visits to parochial
schools.5 2 A public school teacher attending a student religious
group meeting for "custodial purposes" is at least as likely to
assume the role of an active group supporter, or to engage in
discussions about religious doctrine.5 3 Aguilar also suggested that
secular administrators could affect the religious practices of sectar-
ian institutions.54 The Equal Access Act involves similar oversight
problems. The Act instructs school administrators "to assure that
attendance of students at meetings is voluntary.1 55 If a student
group endorsed assertive proselytizing, school regulations designed
to ensure voluntariness could inhibit religious practices.
56
Though administrative entanglement concerns arise when state
officials or employees come into contact with religious institutions,
Supreme Court opinions have not specified the characteristics of
impermissible church-state interactions. It is not clear why the
school aid programs in Meek and Aguilar resulted in unconstitu-
tional administrative entanglement, while the statutes challenged in
Kendrick and Mergens did not.
B. Political Divisiveness
If the Court's opinions on administrative entanglement are
inconsistent, its political divisiveness decisions are virtually incom-
prehensible. In Lemon, the Court wrote that an excessive entan-
glement between religion and government could produce "political
division along religious lines." ' 57 But Lemon and subsequent deci-
sions have provided few clues for identifying those statutes that
suggest an impermissible potential for political divisiveness.
58
,2 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411-12; Meek, 421 U.S. at 370-72.
53 Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(2) (prohibiting school sponsorship of meetings by student
religious, political, or philosophical groups); id. § 4071(c)(3) (allowing school employees to
attend student religious group meetings "only in a nonparticipatory capacity").
-1 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413 (stating that the New York aid program resulted in
excessive entanglement because religious schools "must endure the ongoing presence of state
personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students").
Is 20 U.S.C. § 4071(0.
For example, assertive proselytizing constitutes an important component of the
Jehovah's Witnesses religion. See M. JAwms PENToN, AIocALys DELAYED: THE STORY OF
JEHOVAH'S WNEssES 114-17, 206-08, 242-45 (1985); HERBERT STRoup, Tm JEHOvAH's
Wrrissas 56-59 (1945).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
52 The Court has suggested that evidence of actual political divisiveness does not, of
itself, demonstrate an Establishment Clause violation. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (stating that actual divisiveness alone has never been held sufficient to
invalidate goveriment conduct).
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The Court most frequently has found unconstitutional political
divisiveness in cases challenging aid to sectarian schools.5 9 In Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist,6° the Justices reviewed a
New York law that provided government aid to private elementary
and secondary schools. 61 The Court invalidated provisions funding
private school maintenance- and repair, authorizing tuition reim-
bursements, and allowing state income tax deductions for parents
whose children attended sectarian and other private schools. 62 The
Nyquist majority found that these New York programs each con-
tained a potential for political divisiveness. Justice Powell's major-
ity opinion predicted that the New York funding of sectarian
schools would generate "divisive political consequences, " 63 because
"aid programs of any kind tend to become entrenched, to escalate
in cost, and to generate their own aggressive constituencies. "
64
The Court applied the political divisiveness test outside of the
school aid context in Larson v. Valente.65 Minnesota traditionally
had required some charities to report contributions. As amended
in 1978, the Minnesota reporting law applied only to those religions
receiving less than half of their contributions from members or
affiliated organizations.A6 The Larson Court held that this reporting
requirement violated the Establishment Clause.6 The Minnesota
legislators had amended the reporting requirement to harass a few
small sects that received the majority of their contributions from
solicitation.6 The Court also found that the contribution reporting
19 One Court opinion asserts that the political divisiveness concern should be "confined
to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in
parochial schools." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983). But see, e.g., Lynch,
465 U.S. at 684 (asserting that political divisiveness considerations apply in the display of
a nativity scene in a public park); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253 (1982) (holding a
contribution reporting requirement that discriminated against specific small sects resulted in
unconstitutional political divisiveness); Wakz, 397 U.S. at 695-96 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(assessing the political divisiveness that could result from a tax exemption applicable to
property used for religious worship).
The Court never has convincingly explained why aid to sectarian schools raises more
serious political divisions than do other church-state issues. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403
n.11; infra note 202.
-o 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61 See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 759 (1973).
62 See id. at 77498.
6, Id. at 797.
" Id.
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
6 Id. at 231-32.
67 See id. at 255.
61 See id. at 25455. For further discussion of the Larson opinion, see infra notes 207-
12 and accompanying text.
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law directly implicated the entanglement doctrine. 69 Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion concluded: "[Tlhe distinctions drawn by
[the Minnesota statute] and its fifty per cent rule 'engender a risk
of politicizing religion'-a risk, indeed, that has already been sub-
stantially realized."70
The Court, however, also has upheld government programs
suggesting a similar potential for political divisiveness. In Lynch
v. Donnelly,71 the plaintiffs challenged the sponsorship of a nativity
scene by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island. The creche was
included as part of a Christmas display located in a downtown
park.72 A municipal endorsement of a Christian symbol seems likely
to result in political divisions along religious lines. Non-Christian
believers might campaign vigorously either for the removal of the
nativity scene, or for the inclusion of their own religious symbols
in the City's display.73 In response, Christians might lobby for a
continued Christmas display of the nativity scene, or for the per-
manent display of some other religious symbol.
Political divisiveness, however, was not a mere possibility in
Lynch. The filing of the Lynch suit "unleashed powerful emotional
reactions which divided the city along religious lines." 74 Neverthe-
less, the Court upheld the City's display of the nativity scene. The
religious divisions that surfaced after the Lynch suit was filed did
not compel a finding of political divisiveness. The Court seemed
to view the political tensions as a passing occurrence, noting that
for 40 years Pawtucket's display of the nativity scene had remained
largely uncontroversial. 75 The majority also expressed concern that
activists might use litigation to "create the appearance of divisive-
ness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.
' 7 6
In Marsh v. Chambers,77 the Court also upheld government
action that would seem to harbor the potential for producing
divisiveness along religious lines.78 Traditionally, Nebraska begins
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 252.
70 Id. at 253 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
1- 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
72 Id. at 671-72.
73 Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In many communities, non-Christian groups
can be expected to combat practices similar to Pawtucket's; this will be so especially in
areas where there are substantial non-Christian minorities.").
74 Id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7, See id. at 684.
76 Id. at 684-85.
- 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
- See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
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legislative sessions with a prayer read by a Presbyterian minister. 9
Like the nativity scene challenged in Lynch, the Marsh legislative
prayer might aggravate political divisions along religious lines. For
instance, legislators and taxpayers might support or oppose the
practice on the basis of their religious beliefs. According to the
Marsh dissenters, the prayer reading had "split the Nebraska Leg-
islature on issues of religion and religious conformity." 80 The trial
court record also suggests instances when a particular prayer read
by the minister "led to controversy along religious lines."' 8
Nevertheless, the Marsh Court held that the challenged prayer
did not violate the Establishment Clause.12 The Justices relied
heavily on the long tradition of prayer readings prior to legislative
sessions and other government meetings.8 3 Chief Justice Burger, in
his majority opinion, observed that the United States Congress
continued to authorize a prayer reading by a paid chaplain,84 and
that "most state legislatures begin their sessions with prayer." '85
The Marsh majority did not address political divisiveness concerns
raised by the legislative prayer.
8 6
The political divisiveness decisions are difficult to understand.
The Court has seemed to view government aid to sectarian schools
as raising the most serious threat of political divisiveness,8 7 but it
has not presented evidence or reasons that explain why aid to
sectarian schools presents unusual dangers. In sum, the political
divisiveness prong of Lemon's entanglement doctrine seems little
more than a means of rationalizing a predetermined Establishment
Clause conclusion. 8
Id. at 784-85. Presbyterian minister Robert E. Palmer received a $300 per month
salary when the legislature was in session. Id.
80 Id. at 799-800 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
", Id. at 800 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 795.
,3 As noted by the Marsh majority, during the same week that the United States
House of Representatives approved the Bill of Rights, members of the first Congress also
voted to begin their sessions with a prayer reading. See id. at 790; see also id. at 786 ("The
opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country.").
84 See id. at 786.
Id. at 789 n.l1.
86 See id. at 796-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (criticizing the Marsh majority's refusal
to apply the three-part Lemon test, specifically the entanglement doctrine).
I" See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n. 11 (1983) (stating that political divisiveness concerns
should apply only in aid to sectarian school cases); see also Nyqust, 413 U.S. at 795-98
(holding that aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools violated the political
divisiveness doctrine); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-25 (1971).
"6 See Gaffney, supra note 1, at 211 (describing political divisiveness as "a standardless
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C. Ignoring Entanglement in Free Exercise Clause Cases
The Supreme Court has adopted an artificial dichotomy be-
tween Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause cases. The
Court has assessed cases involving a burden imposed on religions
under the Free Exercise Clause, and has assessed cases involving a
benefit conferred on religions under the Establishment Clause. 9
The Court typically has applied the excessive entanglement test
only in Establishment Clause cases. 90 This limitation seems difficult
to explain. Many Free Exercise Clause cases appear to involve the
same administrative entanglement and political divisiveness issues
that have resulted in Establishment Clause violations.
Entanglement concerns are structurally inherent in free exercise
exemption cases. In a typical exemption case, an individual does
not assert that the general application of a statute violates the First
Amendment. Instead, the individual seeks special relief from the
statute because the law conflicts with the individual's religious
tenets. 91 Ironically, the very judicial review of religious doctrine
mask disguising the real reasons why federal judges nullify controversial legislation");
Paulsen, supra note 23, at 347 (stating that "the divisiveness concept is inherently unprin-
cipled").
9See Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817, 821-22 (1984); Kurland, supra note 2, at 15.
This dichotomy is artificial because all church-state cases involve both benefits and
burdens. For example, the Court always has considered government aid to sectarian schools
as benefiting religion and raising an Establishment Clause issue. See, e.g., School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381-98 (1985); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408-14. Yet, such aid also burdens
the religious beliefs of many taxpayers who must subsidize a religious institution that they
oppose. The Court thus could treat aid to sectarian schools as raising a Free Exercise Clause
issue.
Likewise, the Court has considered laws against proselytizing as burdening religious
groups that wish to engage in such activities. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-56 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108-17 (1943). But, these laws also benefit religious groups that oppose proselytizing.
In short, it is possible to reconceptualize any Establishment Clause case as a Free Exercise
Clause case, and vice versa. See Kurland, supra note 2, at 15-18.
10 But see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In Catholic Bishop, the
Court concluded that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over religious employers. The Court
relied in part on a statutory interpretation argument, concluding that Congress did not
intend to confer NLRB jurisdiction over such employers. See id. at 504-07. The Court also
suggested that NLRB jurisdiction might violate the free exercise rights of religious employers,
by resulting in administrative entanglement. See id. at 501-04; see also Ripple, supra note
1, at 1210-14 (discussing entanglement analysis in Free Exercise Clause cases).
," See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
Ray. 146, 152 (1986); David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40
EMoRY L.J. 77, 79-101 (1991); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause:
A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 350 n.1 (1980).
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and beliefs necessary to determine an individual's eligibility for an
exemption seems to constitute administrative entanglement. Fur-
thermore, by definition, any special relief from a general statute
accrues only to members of particular religions, potentially causing
political divisiveness. 92
The Court's decision in Thomas v. Review Board93 illustrates
the presence of entanglement concerns in free exercise cases. In
Thomas, a member of the pacifist Jehovah's Witnesses was trans-
ferred by his employer to a job fabricating turrets for military
tanks. 94 Because this new employment conflicted with his pacifist
religious principles, Thomas left his job and applied for unem-
ployment compensation.95
The State of Indiana denied the benefits claim filed by Thomas,
relying on an Indiana law that proscribed unemployment compen-
sation when a claimant voluntarily had quit his job.9 Thomas
challenged this administrative decision, asserting that the state's
denial of unemployment benefits unconstitutionally burdened his
religious beliefs. The United States Supreme Court agreed with
Thomas, holding that Indiana's denial of unemployment compen-
sation violated the Free Exercise Clause.
97
The Court's own act of exempting Thomas from the Indiana
unemployment compensation rule seems to violate both the admin-
istrative entanglement and political divisiveness elements of the
entanglement doctrine. Judicial enforcement of the religious ex-
emption created in Thomas would require courts in each voluntary
unemployment case to assess whether a claimant's job duties con-
flicted with the tenets of his religion. In other words, courts would
investigate the principles of a particular claimant's religion and
would necessarily determine the components of religious scripture.98
92 See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 683 (1980) (suggesting that religious exemption
decisions implicate political divisiveness concerns).
- 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
94 Eddie Thomas previously had worked in a plant that manufactured sheet steel.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
9SId.
Id. at 711-12.
See id. at 720 (following Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). But see Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (1990) (limiting Sherbert
exemptions to unemployment cases).
" See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (1981) (holding that a state cannot require that an
unemployment compensation claimant be "put to a choice between fidelity to religious
belief or cessation of work"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19, 234-26 (1972)
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To prevent fraudulent benefits claims brought by individuals that
have quit their jobs, courts applying an exemption also must de-
termine whether each compensation claim is premised on a sincerely
held religious belief.9 Based on these considerations, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Thomas dissent concluded that determining whether to
grant a judicial exemption inherently results in unconstitutional
administrative entanglement. 10
Judicial enforcement of a religious exemption also invites po-
litical divisiveness along religious lines. The Thomas decision al-
lowed only pacifist believers to receive unemployment benefits after
quitting a military-related job. Neither atheists nor members of
religions that accept warfare would have this option. The prefer-
ential treatment accorded in the exemption provides a likely source
of divisiveness along religious lines.
The entanglement problems generated by free exercise exemp-
tions also are illustrated in Wisconsin v. Yoder.101 The Yoder
decision exempted Amish teenagers from a Wisconsin law requiring
school attendance by children under sixteen.10 The Court, deciding
that traditional high school attendance would conflict with the
Amish principle of separatism, exempted the Amish children from
the Wisconsin compulsory schooling law. 0 3
In reaching this result, the Justices undertook a painstaking
review of Amish religious principles. The majority asserted that
the Amish belief in separatism was "one of deep religious convic-
tion," and "fundamental to the Amish faith."' The Court also
concluded that the state interest in universal education did not
(exempting Amish teenagers from a compulsory high school attendance law after a detailed
review of the Amish principle of separatism). But see Smith, - U.S. at __, 110 S.
Ct. at 1604 (holding that judges should not assess the centrality of the religious beliefs
asserted in free exercise cases).
- See Smith, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1615 (acknowledging that courts must
determine the sincerity of a claimant's beliefs in free exercise cases); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't
of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (noting the difficulties inherent in "deter-
mining whether a professed belief is sincerely held"); William P. Marshall, The Case Against
the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W. Rrs. L. Rnv. 357,
386 (1989-1990) ("Creating constitutionally compelled exemptions under the [F]ree [Eixercise
[Clause necessitates inquiry into the sincerity and religiosity of the religious claim.").
11 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(holding compulsory schooling of Amish children unconstitutional after a review of Amish
religious principles).
101 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
102 See id. at 205, 234.
See id. at 215-18, 234-36.
Id. at 216.
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outweigh the religious interests because "the Amish community has
been a highly successful social unit within our society, even if apart
from the conventional 'mainstream." ' 05 This sort of investigation
into and evaluation of religious beliefs seems to violate the admin-
istrative entanglement doctrine.
Yoder further suggests a potential for political divisiveness. The
Yoder exemption excused only Amish teenagers from high school
attendance. Other parents could not remove their children from
Wisconsin high schools, even if these parents needed help in run-
ning a family business or farm.
The majority opinion in Thomas did not mention the entangle-
ment doctrine. Because the Court reviewed the case under the Free
Exercise Clause, it did not invoke the excessive entanglement test,
which traditionally is applicable only in Establishment Clause cases.
Formalism, however, should not obscure inconsistent results. While
the Court has invalidated state aid to sectarian schools on entan-
glement grounds, it has mandated religious exemptions that raise
similar entanglement problems. 106
D. Summary
The excessive entanglement doctrine currently applied by the
Court is unsatisfactory. 1°7 The Court has described administrative
entanglement and political divisiveness in only the vaguest terms.
Administrative entanglement seems to proscribe laws that result in
either too great an intrusion by government on religious institu-
tions, or too great an influence by religious institutions on secular
personnel. Court decisions on administrative entanglement reflect
this subjective inquiry. The decisions are unpredictable and incon-
sistent.
Court discussions of potential political divisiveness are even less
clear.'0 The Court has not developed any method for identifying
105 Id. at 222.
10 One recent Court opinion suggests that a majority of current Justices may view
many religious exemptions with disfavor. See Smith, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
See also Marshall, supra note 99, at 411 ("The maintenance of the free exercise exemption
does not intelligibly, or even stringently, protect religious values and religious liberties.").
,07 See Ripple, supra note 1, at 1217 ("IT]he excessive entanglement test invites a
whole new degree of subjectivity and thus represents, in a very real sense, the ultimate
defeat of attempts to use neutral principles to interpret the religion clauses.").
101 See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 347 ("[T]he divisiveness concept is inherently un-
principled."); Ripple, supra note 1, at 1218. But cf. David R. Scheidemantle, Note, Political
Entanglement as an Independent Test of Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause,
52 FoRDHA L. REvmw 1209, 1232-41 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court should add
a fourth "political entanglement" prong to the Lemon test).
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those laws that present impermissible political divisiveness. Finally,
the Court has failed to reconcile fully' 9 free exercise decisions
mandating religious exemptions with either administrative entan-
glement or political divisiveness concerns.
The current entanglement doctrine is unacceptable as a method
of constitutional adjudication.'10 The Court should either develop
a consistent, principled, and predictable law of excessive entangle-
ment or abandon the entanglement doctrine altogether.
II. TAE CONFUCT BETWEEN ENTANGLEMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The entanglement doctrine conflicts with several important con-
stitutional principles. First, Supreme Court decisions have devel-
oped and protected rights to political participation. 1 ' Both the
administrative efitanglement and political divisiveness doctrines,
however, would seem to limit the political participation of religious
groups. Second, Court decisions interpret the Free Speech Clause
as applying with the greatest force in cases involving volatile or
emotive political speech." 2 The political divisiveness doctrine, how-
ever, disfavors religiously motivated political speech. Third, the
Court's Establishment Clause decisions have mandated that gov-
ernment may not discriminate against or show favoritism toward
particular religious groups."' But the very judicial application of
the entanglement doctrine involves discrimination because the doc-
trine will effect only those religious groups that endorse political
activism. Because the entanglement test conflicts with much ac-
cepted constitutional doctrine, the Court should disavow any en-
tanglement inquiry." 4
A. Entanglement and Rights to Political Access
Since the 1960s, decisions ensuring rights to political partici-
pation have occupied a central place in the Supreme Court's con-
10 See supra note 106.
110 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (blaming entanglement test
for "many of the inconsistencies in our Establishment Clause decisions"); Roemer v.
Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 769 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("The 'excessive
entanglement' test appears no less 'curious and mystifying' than when it was first an-
nounced.").
M" See infra part II.A.
12 See infra part II.B.
M See infra part II.C.
11 See infra part II.D.
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stitutional adjudication. The excessive entanglement doctrine,
however, conflicts with Supreme Court decisions facilitating polit-
ical access. Active political participation by religious groups impli-
cates serious administrative entanglement and political divisiveness
concerns.
Several different lines of Supreme Court cases have sought to
facilitate political participation. Perhaps the most familiar of these
doctrines requires that each individual's vote receive equal weight.
For example, in Reynolds v. Sims," 5 the Court considered an equal
protection challenge to Alabama's legislative districting.116 The Al-
abama legislature had not revised voting district boundaries since
1901. By the early 1960s, a majority of state legislators were elected
by only about twenty-five percent of Alabama voters. 17
The Reynolds Court held that this districting violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion concluded: "Logically, in a society
ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would seem
reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a
majority of that State's legislators."" 8 The Reynolds Court re-
quired Alabama's legislators to "make an honest and good faith
effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as
nearly of equal population as is practicable."1 9
Even districting consistent with Reynolds's one-man, one-vote
principle may violate the Equal Protection Clause if the districting
is designed to minimize the'voting power of racial minorities. White
v. Regester 20 involved an equal protection challenge to the 1970
reapportionment of the legislative districts of the Texas house of
representatives. This reapportionment complied with the Reynolds
one-man, one-vote standard.' 2' Nevertheless, the Texas redistricting
violated the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the voting strength
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
,16 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964).
M' Id. at 545.
Is Id. at 565.
"'9 Id. at 577; see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 410-21 (1977) (holding that the
district court's revision of Mississippi legislative districts did not comply with the one-man,
one-vote standard); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969) (holding that even de
minimis variations from numerically equal voting districts could violate the one-man, one-
vote standard).
-- 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
121 Id.
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of blacks and Hispanics. 122 The White Court concluded that the
redistricting was "being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups."''
The Court also has invalidated impediments to political partic-
ipation not involving an explicit de-emphasis of certain votes. In
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,'24 the Court held that a
Virginia poll tax of $1.50 violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The majority concluded that states
could not qualify voting rights with conditions that would adversely
affect poor citizens.1
26
In Buckley v. Valeo, 27 the Court reviewed several sections of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.'2 The Act included a
provision prohibiting expenditures of more than $1,000 per year
toward the campaign of any particular candidate. 2 9 The Court held
that this expenditure limitation violated the First Amendment 30
because it limited the ability of individuals to address election issues
or the merits of particular candidates.'
The Court thus has recognized broad rights to political partic-
ipation through a number of constitutional provisions. But, under
the entanglement doctrine, religious organizations and believers
may constitute the one group not protected by these rights. Active
political participation by religious groups would raise both admin-
istrative entanglement and political divisiveness concerns.
The Court has used the administrative entanglement test to
invalidate programs that could result in a religious influence on
secular personnel and institutions.3 2 Yet, religious organizations
presumably engage in political activity to achieve just such an
'2 Id. at 765-66; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-80 (1986) (holding
that redistricting of the North Carolina legislature resulted in an unlawful dilution of
minority votes); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-28 (1982) (holding that the selection
of the Burke County, Georgia board of commissioners in an at-large election violated the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
123 White, 412 U.S. at 765.
1- 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
126 See id. at 668.
127 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
1 See id. § 437(g).
"' See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam).
" See id. at 47-51. The Buckley Court upheld provisions of the Act that limited
contributions to federal candidates. See id. at 23-38.
332 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 253-55 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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influence. Religiously motivated political participation thus is at
odds with the prohibition on administrative entanglement.
Political participation by religious groups also could lead to
political divisiveness. The Court has held that statutes benefiting
religious institutions may result in "political divisions along relig-
ious lines,' ' 33 dividing voters into opposing camps on the basis of
religious affiliation. 134 Political divisiveness along religious lines
appears particularly likely when a religious organization supports
a particular candidate, or takes a position on a contested political
issue. Like the administrative entanglement test, the political divi-
siveness test appears inconsistent with Court decisions guarantying
broad rights to political participation. 135
The Supreme Court has followed differing approaches in cases
challenging the political participation of religions or religious lead-
ers. The Court's most extensive discussion of religious political
participation came in McDaniel v. Paty.136 Paul McDaniel, an
ordained Baptist minister, was elected to serve as a delegate to the
1977 Tennessee Constitutional Convention. 37 Tennessee law pro-
vided that no minister or priest could serve either in the state
legislature, or as a delegate to a state constitutional convention 3 s
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that McDaniel could not serve
as a convention delegate, 39 and the minister appealed. The Court
held that this disqualification of ministers from holding public
office was unconstitutional."' According to the Court, Tennessee's
constitutional provision interfered with "the right to preach, pros-
"3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
' See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252-55 (1982) (invalidating a statute
that required particular religious groups to report contributions); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (invalidating a state program that funded counseling and related
services at private schools).
,31 See Gaffney, supra note 1, at 232 (arguing that the political divisiveness test is
inconsistent with "the right of all citizens to participate fully in the process of political
decision making in our democracy"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
Rnv. 1, 24 (1973) (arguing that improper application of the political divisiveness test could
result in "various religious groups feeling impelled or enticed by the test either to conceal
or to feign interest in an area of legislative activity or inaction").
1- 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion).
,17 Id. at 621.
3I See TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
"9 See Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897, 903-10 (Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 435 U.S. 618
(1978).
I- See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629.
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elytize, and perform other similar religious functions," and thus
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.14'
Yet, the McDaniel Court stopped short of announcing a general
rule that states may not bar religious leaders from political office.
Instead, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion focused on the
state interest asserted by Tennessee in support of the disqualifica-
tion provision-"preventing the establishment of a state relig-
ion." 142 The Court found this asserted state interest less than
compelling. The plurality opinion concluded: "Tennessee has failed
to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation
in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may
have once enjoyed."' 143 The implication is that were a state to
demonstrate that divisiveness could occur, it might legitimately
prohibit political candidacies by religious leaders.' 44
Justice White's McDaniel concurrence endorsed a similar nar-
row holding. Justice White would not have decided McDaniel on
free exercise grounds. Instead, his concurrence argued that the
Tennessee disqualification provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 Justice White viewed this
limitation on ministers' political candidacies as "both underinclu-
sive and overinclusive."' 46 Tennessee barred clergymen only from
legislative positions, not from "executive and judicial offices."' 47
McDaniel thus suggests that a potential for political divisiveness
could justify barring religious leaders from public office.148
In Harris v. McRae,149 the Court considered a variety of con-
stitutional challenges to the Hyde Amendment to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act. 50 Under the Hyde Amendment, federal Title
"I See id. at 626.
242 Id. at 628.
143 Id.
'" See LAuRENCE H. TamE, AMERCAN CoNsTrrunoNL LAw § 14-14, at 1266 (2d ed.
1988); Ripple, supra note 1, at 1212 (arguing that the McDaniel opinion may indicate that
"absent such a tradition of easy accommodation, entanglement values will not be treated
quite so perfunctorily when weighed against free exercise claims").
'4' McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring).
", Id. at 645 (White, J., concurring).
147 Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White also viewed the disqualification of min-
isters as overinclusive because "it applies with equal force to those ministers whose religious
beliefs would not prevent them from properly discharging their duties as constitutional
convention delegates." Id.
1 See TRamE, supra note 144, § 14-14, at 1279-82.
",' 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
I"' Title XIX established a joint federal-state program designed to provide assistance
to needy individuals. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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XIX monies cannot be used to fund abortions, except "where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term," ' or in cases of rape or incest. The Harris plaintiffs
alleged that the Hyde Amendment violates the Establishment Clause
"because it incorporates into law the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time
at which life commences.' 5 2 The Hyde Amendment also raises
administrative entanglement and political divisiveness problems.
The Amendment seemed to involve the type of religious influence
on secular institutions proscribed by the administrative entangle-
ment test. 5 3 By endorsing the position on abortion taken by a
particular church, the Hyde Amendment also suggested a potential
for political divisiveness along religious lines.
154
Though Harris arguably involved the same conflict between
political access rights and entanglement present in McDaniel, the
Court needed only one paragraph to dismiss the plaintiffs' Estab-
lishment Clause challenge. 55 Justice Stewart's majority opinion
labeled the Hyde Amendment "as much a reflection of 'tradition-
alist' values towards abortion as it is an embodiment of the views
of any particular religion. 15 6 This Establishment Clause discussion
gave little weight to any similarity between the Hyde Amendment
and Catholic doctrine. The majority wrote: "That the Judeo-Chris-
tian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the
Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny.' 511 7 The Harris opinion did
not mention the entanglement test.'58
A third Court opinion addressing religious involvement in pol-
itics also provides little insight into the political access rights of
M Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662 (1979).
"12 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980).
- See id. For an example of the proscription, see Meek, 421 U.S. 349 (invalidating
loan of instruction materials to parochial schools because of excessive entanglement).
IM See Tribe, supra note 135, at 18-25 (describing issues raised by abortion as resulting
in an unusually high potential for political divisiveness).
" See Harris, 448 U.S. at 319. The Harris plaintiffs also unsuccessfully contended
that the Hyde Amendment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see
id. at 312-18, 321-26, and the Free Exercise Clause, see id. at 320-21.
Im Id. at 319 (citing McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741 (E.D.N.Y.) (trial
court), rev'd, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)).
157 Id.
- None of the four dissents in Harris gave any significant attention to the Establish-
ment Clause problems raised by the Hyde Amendment, and none of these dissents mentioned
the entanglement test. See id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 337 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 349 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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religions and religious leaders. Under a Massachusetts statute chal-
lenged in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,159 the governing body of
a church could prohibit liquor consumption at a nearby bar or
restaurant. 60 In 1977, Grendel's Den, in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, applied to the Cambridge License Commission for a liquor
license. The Holy Cross Armenian Catholic parish, located next to
Grendel's Den, vetoed the restaurant's liquor license application.
16'
Grendel's Den subsequently filed suit, contending that Massachu-
setts's delegation of license veto powers was unconstitutional.
The Court agreed that this delegation violated the Establish-
ment Clause. 62 The Massachusetts statute improperly delegated "to
private nongovernmental agencies power to veto certain liquor
license applications," a power that "ordinarily is vested in agencies
of government."' 63 The license veto delegation thus had the uncon-
stitutional "primary and principal effect of advancing religion."'
64
The statute also resulted in an excessive entanglement of govern-
ment and religion by "vesting significant governmental authority
in churches.' 65 In an unilluminating passage, Chief Justice Burger
attempted to specify the entanglement problems raised by the stat-
ute:
[T]he core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is
preventing 'a fusion of government and religious functions ... '
The Framers did not set up a system of government in which
important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated
to or shared with religious institutions. 66
To summarize, the entanglement doctrine conflicts with Court
decisions that guaranty rights to political access. Political partici-
pation by religions and religious leaders apparently would violate
both the administrative entanglement and political divisiveness el-
ements of the entanglement doctrine. Although the McDaniel opin-
ion recognizes this conflict, the Court has not suggested a principled
"' 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
"' The Massachusetts law gave the same liquor license veto power to the governing
bodies of schools. The law applied to bars and restaurants located within 500 yards of a
church or school. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 16C (1974).
- See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1982).
"6 See id. Justice Rehnquist filed a lone dissent. See id. at 127.
263 Id. at 122.
I" Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 126.
'"Id. at 126-27 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963)).
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reconciliation of the entanglement doctrine with rights to political
access.
B. Political Speech and Political Divisiveness
Political speech receives extensive protection under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 67 The Supreme Court has en-
dorsed "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." ' 6l The Court and commentators have viewed political de-
bate as an essential part of the participatory democratic government
outlined in the Constitution. 69 Neither truly representative elections
nor popular participation in policy formation would be possible
without the unrestrained freedom to discuss political issues.170 De-
spite this high value on political speech, the entanglement doctrine
prohibits controversial or volatile speech on religious issues.1
7'
Given the commitment to an open discussion of political issues,
individuals engaging in a moderate and conventional political dia-
logue rarely will require the protection of the First Amendment.
Only speakers who profess radical or unorthodox messages are
likely to invoke the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of dissident speech, which "induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, and even stirs people to anger.'
' 72
167 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
223 (1989) ("Indeed, the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for public office." (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (stating that the Court
has "consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on public
issues"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (noting that political speech "is at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms").
"6 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 ("Discussion of political issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution.").
110 See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 93-94 (1980) (arguing that
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses "were centrally intended to help make our govern-
mental processes work, to ensure open and informed discussion of political issues, and to
check our government when it gets out of bounds"); ALEXANDER MEEmifOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNmENT 27 (1948) ("The principle of freedom of speech
springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.").
'71 See Gaffney, supra note 1, at 234 (stating that religiously motivated speech is
protected "only if it does not touch on divisive religious issues"); Paulsen, supra note 23,
at 346 ("[T]he entanglement doctrine comes perilously close to suggesting that religious
groups and individuals are not entitled to the same civil and political rights as others.").
"7 See, e.g., Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (holding that a "Fuck the
Draft" slogan printed on a jacket qualified as a form of protected speech).
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The Court's free speech decisions often have protected indivi-
duals engaging in extreme and hostile discourse. For example, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,173 a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted
under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute.174 The conviction was
based on events occurring at a Ku Klux Klan rally, where the
defendant's speech attacked blacks and Jews, and suggested the
possibility of violence at some future date.
175
The Court reversed this conviction, holding that the Ohio crim-
inal syndicalism law violated the First Amendment. 176 The Court
concluded that a State could proscribe speakers from advocating
the use of force only "where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."'" Because the Ohio statute punished persons
that "'advocate or teach the duty, necessity or propriety' of vio-
lence, ' 1 78 the statute violated the First Amendment.
79
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,180 the Court again
applied the First Amendment to protect volatile political speech
that suggested possible violence.'" The Claiborne Hardware liti-
gation challenged a boycott organized by black activists in Clai-
borne County, Mississippi. The boycott demanded that local white
merchants treat black customers with respect and hire black em-
ployees.'82 Justice Stevens's majority opinion described this boycott
as including "elements of criminality and elements of majesty.'
8 3
In addition to speeches and rallies, some individuals attempted to
intimidate Claiborne County blacks that did business with white
merchants. Tactics included both the firing of shots at the homes
of boycott nonparticipants, and physical confrontations with these
individuals. 184
White merchants that had lost business during the boycott
initiated suit in Mississippi state court. The state court chancellor
. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
,14 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444 (1969) (per curiam).
M See id. at 446 & n.l.
176 See id. at 449.
117 Id. at 447.
I Id. at 448 (quoting Omao REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson 1953) (repealed
1974)).
" See id. at 448-50.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
" See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889-934 (1982).
"9 Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 888.
See id. at 904-05.
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found liability under three different civil conspiracy theories and
entered judgments against 130 defendants. 18 5 But the Supreme Court
stated that the boycott contained elements of "speech or conduct
that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments."' 8 6 Direct acts of violence could not be im-
puted to the vast majority of defendants, requiring the state court
to find liability based on guilt by association. 87 The Claiborne
Hardware Court held that the conspiracy judgment punished the
defendants for their speech and association, violating the First
Amendment guaranty of freedom of speech. 88
The entanglement doctrine is inconsistent with the broad rec-
ognition of rights to political speech. Religiously motivated political
speech might result in administrative entanglement problems. 89
Also, the political divisiveness doctrine seems to severely restrain
speech addressing religious issues. The political divisiveness test
seeks to discourage "political division along religious lines."'1'9
Religiously motivated speech on political issues almost certainly
would generate political divisiveness along religious lines. Accord-
ingly, the political divisiveness doctrine, if strictly enforced, would
eliminate protection for religiously motivated political speech.' 9'
To date, the Court has not discussed political divisiveness con-
cerns in cases involving religiously motivated political speech. In-
" Id. at 890-92.
'1 Id. at 907.
I" Id. at 925.
,0 See id; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the First
Amendment protects a protestor who burns the American flag); Boos, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)
(holding that the First Amendment protects protestors' rights to display critical and possibly
inflammatory signs outside of foreign embassies).
I" The administrative entanglement doctrine is implicated by situations where secular
authorities may interfere with church institutions and doctrine. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at
412-13; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20. Government may regulate all forms of speech, including
political speech, with "time, place, and manner" restrictions. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784-91 (1989) (holding that New York City could require
music performers to use both a sound system and sound technicians provided by the city,
to ensure that noise from a concert would not disturb nearby residents); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 78-79 (1949) (upholding a city ordinance that prohibited loud and raucous
sound amplification). In some cases, such restrictions might result in government intrusion
on religious organizations, which is prohibited by the administrative entanglement doctrine.
"9 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622; see supra notes 19-20 and'accompanying text.
"I See Choper, supra note 92, at 683-84 (arguing that an attempt to prevent religious
conflict in the legislative process would be contrary to First Amendment liberties); Ripple,
supra note 1, at 1226 (stating that the entanglement doctrine suggests "a reappraisal of the
traditionally privileged place of political and associational rights of religious institutions and
individual citizens motivated by religious principles").'
[VoL. 80
ENTANGLEMENT
stead, the Court has granted religiously motivated political speech
the same broad protection as political speech resulting from other
motivations. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,92
the plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge against a
law requiring public school students to participate in a flag salute
ceremony. The Barnette plaintiffs were members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses church, whose beliefs conflicted with the ceremony.1 93
The Barnette suit suggested a potential for the type of political
divisiveness proscribed by the entanglement test. Prohibiting the
school ceremony could lead to political conflict along religious
lines between the Jehovah's Witnesses and proponents of the flag
salute.
Justice Jackson's majority opinion, however, did not invoke
entanglement or divisiveness. Instead, Justice Jackson applied the
strict scrutiny test traditionally employed in political speech cases. 94
The Court's conclusion that the flag salute ceremony violated the
Free Speech Clause has become a familiar part of the Court's First
Amendment doctrine: "If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion .... ",195
In Wooley v. Maynard,196 the Court more recently provided
broad First Amendment protection to religiously motivated political
speech. Plaintiff George Maynard was convicted of violating a
New Hampshire statute by obscuring the state motto "Live Free
or Die" on his automobile license plates. 97 Like the Barnette
plaintiffs, Maynard was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses
religion. Maynard contended that the state motto violated his re-
ligious belief in pacifism.19 Relying heavily on Barnette, the Wooley
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The Jehovah's Witnesses religion proscribes recognition of any graven image, in-
cluding the American flag. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629
(1943).
114 See id. at 633 ("It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of
expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a
clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish.").
Id. at 642.
"' 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977). After he was found guilty of
concealing the motto for a second time; Maynard received and served a 15-day jail sentence.
Id. at 708.
"I Id. at 707 n.2.
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Court affirmed the reversal of Maynard's conviction. The Court
wrote that Maynard's conviction conflicted with the broad First
Amendment protection accorded political speech and belief.' 99 The
New Hampshire law improperly required Maynard "to be an in-
strument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable." 2°°
Neither Barnette nor Wooley mentioned political divisiveness
as a concern. 20 ' Nonetheless, these and other First Amendment
decisions represent a serious, unaddressed conflict between the
political divisiveness test and the political speech doctrine.e 2 Polit-
ical speech cases have concluded that political dissension, racist
epithets, and even an advocacy of violence receive substantial First
Amendment protection. Yet, the Court has invalidated statutes
under the entanglement test because the potential political divisive-
ness along religious lines would present "a threat to the normal
political process." 203 Perhaps some rationale explains why conduct
likely to result in political divisiveness both is protected under the
Free Speech Clause and prohibited under the Establishment Clause.
The Court has not given such an explanation.204
C. Entanglement and Religious Discrimination
Supreme Court decisions have condemned government discrim-
ination against particular religions, describing a prohibition on such
unequal treatment as a core element of the Establishment Clause. 205
As one Court opinion concludes: "An attack founded on disparate
treatment of 'religious' claims invokes what is perhaps the central
purpose of the Establishment Clause-the purpose of ensuring
government neutrality in matters of religion." ' The entanglement
"' See id. at 714-15.
=0 Id. at 715.
20 Barnette was decided in 1943, more than 25 years before the Court first endorsed
a political divisiveness test.
=2 See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 2, at 19 (arguing that under the political divisiveness
test, "the Supreme Court's opinions in the school prayer cases and in the abortion cases
would themselves be violations of the [F]irst [A]mendment").
20 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
214 Cf. Gaffney, supra note 1, at 233 (arguing that the political divisiveness test
"misconstrues the purpose of the [F]irst [A]mendment as a mandate for consensus politics");
Kurland, supra note 2, at 19 (suggesting that the school prayer cases violate the First
Amendment).
20 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (describing the "principle of denominational neutral-
ity"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (stating that government must be
"neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice").
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971).
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doctrine, which primarily affects those religions that embrace po-
litical activism, is itself discriminatory and violates religious neu-
trality.
0 The Court's decision in Larson v. Valente explicitly invoked
the Establishment Clause prohibition on religious discrimination. 2c
The Larson decision invalidated a Minnesota law imposing contri-
bution reporting requirements. The reporting requirements applied
only to religious groups that received more than half of their
contributions from nonmembers.m The Larson Court acknowl-
edged that Minnesota had a legitimate interest in preventing fraud-
ulent solicitation.20 However, the state's legislators intentionally
had imposed the reporting requirement on only a few small sects
that collected most of their revenues from solicitation, while ex-
empting traditional religions supported primarily by members.
210
The Act was unconstitutional because it involved "the selective
legislative imposition of burdens and advantages upon particular
denominations, ' 211 and specifically was intended to burden the
Unification Church.
212
The Court also relied on a finding of religious discrimination
in Epperson v. Arkansas.213 An Arkansas statute prohibited public
high school instructors from teaching "the theory or doctrine that
mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals.
' 214
The Epperson Court struck down this Arkansas prohibition on the
teaching of evolutionary theories. Justice Fortas, in his majority
opinion, recognized broad state discretion in formulating a school
curriculum. 21 5 Justice Fortas even suggested that a school district
might exclude any classroom discussion of man's origins. 216 But
Arkansas could not favor a "fundamentalist sectarian convic-
tion, 217 while attempting "to silence proponents of Darwinian
evolution."
218
207 Larson also relied in part on a finding of potential political divisiveness. See supra
text accompanying notes 68-70.
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 231-32; supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 248.
210 See id. at 255 (stating that the "express design" of the Minnesota reporting require-
ment was "to burden or favor religious denominations").
211 Id. at 254.
212 Id. at 254-55.
2 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
214 Id. at 98-99.
210 See id. at 104.
216 See id. at 109; see also id. at 111 (Black, J., concurring) (indicating that prohibiting
teaching of all human development may be permissible).
217 Id. at 108.
218 Id. at 109.
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In the most general sense, the entanglement doctrine proscribes
some forms of interaction between government and religion.219 But,
various religions view interaction with government very differently.
Some religions, including a number of mainstream Protestanto
groups, seek to avoid relationships with government.2" On the
other hand, the Catholic Church and Fundamentalist Christian
religions actively have engaged in political participation and lob-
bying.2' The prohibition on political divisiveness and administra-
tive entanglement largely affects only activist religions, and has
little or no impact on politically passive religious groups. The
following hypothetical situation demonstrates why such discrimi-
nation is inappropriate.
Assume that every December the municipality of Hulls Landing
has displayed a Christian nativity scene and a Jewish menorah in
a public park.m Hulls Landing has erected these symbols without
the involvement of any religious organization. The City has used
public funds to maintain the symbols. Hulls Landing has sponsored
these two symbols for decades without any significant public re-
action.
Now, a Fundamentalist church, recently established in Hulls
Landing, wishes to display a plaque of the biblical Ten Command-
ments together with the other symbols. Some Hulls Landing resi-
219 See Ripple, supra note 1, at 1200-01; Simson, supra note 2, at 934-35 (describing
entanglement as "a rather vague concept that the Court essentially has equated with any
contact between church and state").
220 See generally RIcHARD E. MORGAN, THE PoLrrics OF RELIoIOUS CONFLICT: CHURCH
AND STATE IN AwmiCA 20-23, 49-52 (2d ed. 1980) (describing "separationist" principles
advocated by mainstream Protestant denominations); A. JAmS RMEY, RELIION IN
AMPUCuAN PUBLIC Lin 3-4 (1985) (noting that mainstream Protestant religions have sought
to avoid direct intervention in American politics).
22 The political activism of some Catholic Church authorities, who have threatened
that Catholic politicians supporting legalized abortions might suffer excommunication, has
received substantial attention. See, e.g., Ari L. Goldman, O'Connor Warns Politicians Risk
Excommunication Over Abortion, N.Y. Tnmss, June 15, 1990, at Al; Eric Pace, Clerics at
Odds on Excommunication for Abortion, N.Y. Tmsas, June 16, 1990, § 1 (Metropolitan),
at 26; see also James N. Baker et al., The Church Strikes Back, NEwswEax, Dec. 18, 1989,
at 28. During the 1980s, Christian Fundamentalists organized a well publicized and active
opposition to certain political candidates. See, e.g., George J. Church et al., Politics from
the Pulpit, Tnm, Oct. 13, 1980, at 28; John W. Mashek et al., As Moral Majority Girds
for '82 Elections, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPoRT, June 21, 1982, at 43; Allan J. Mayer et
al., A Tide of Born-Again Politics, NEwswEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at 28.
2n The Court has upheld some government displays of religious symbols. See County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578-655 (1989) (allowing display of Christmas tree
and menorah in front of a government office building); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
672-87 (1984) (upholding municipal display of a nativity scene in a shopping district).
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dents are suspicious of the Fundamentalist church and oppose the
new symbol. In response, the Fundamentalists agree to pay all
costs associated with the Ten Commandments display and encour-
age municipal officers to review and modify any unseemly features
of the plaque. After a heated political debate, the Hulls Landing
City Council approves a Ten Commandments display.
A group of Hulls Landing residents now brings an Establish-
ment Clause suit, which challenges all city displays of religious
symbols. The entanglement test suggests a strange distinction. The
municipality's posting of the nativity scene and the menorah raises
no entanglement problems. The traditional posting of these symbols
has resulted in neither administrative entanglement nor political
divisiveness. But the display of the Ten Commandments violates
the entanglement doctrine. The municipality's review and modifi-
cation of this newer display would violate the administrative en-
tanglement doctrine m The volatile political debate generated by
this display would raise serious political divisiveness concerns. 4
Beyond the doctrinal nuances of the entanglement test, it is hard
to understand why these two displays should generate different
Establishment Clause results. The Fundamentalists' resort to po-
litical action constitutes the only significant difference between the
new and traditional Hulls Landing displays. 6
The hypothetical also suggests that small or unpopular religions
may face significant entanglement problems. Government decision
makers often will accommodate popular religions with little
prompting, both because these religions include numerous voters,
and because these religions embrace familiar tenets. The religious
practices of small and nontraditional sects are much less likely to
This hypothetical illustrates a perverse result of the administrative entanglement
doctrine. The more closely and conscientiously a government supervises a program involving
a church-state relationship, the more likely a court will find unconstitutional administrative
entanglement. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 428-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
224 In Lynch, the Court rejected a political divisiveness challenge to a municipality's
sponsorship of a Christian nativity scene. But as noted above, the Lynch Court's reasoning
seems inconsistent with other Court discussions of political divisiveness. See supra text
accompanying notes 71-76.
225 If anything, perhaps the Ten Commandments display described in this hypothetical
should raise less serious Establishment Clause concerns than the other symbols. Private
contributions by the Fundamentalist church will pay for the new display, while tax revenues
fund the erection of the nativity scene and the menorah.
m This hypothetical again suggests an incompatibility between the entanglement doc-
trine and constitutional rights to political access. See supra part II.A.
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enjoy a similar familiarity or accommodation. 227 Members of mi-
nority religions may have a greater need for political action and
may face more frequent entanglement problems.
For example, Christians wishing to observe a Sunday Sabbath
need not undertake any form of government lobbying. Most em-
ployers close their businesses on Sunday, either voluntarily or under
the requirements of state law.? Similarly, Catholics who wish to
use sacramental wine during religious services will not run afoul
of any government code.229 On the other hand, the Seventh-Day
Adventist that celebrates a Saturday Sabbath may require some
governm ent action to free this day from work. 210 And, Native
American believers that ingest the hallucinogenic cactus peyote as
a central part of religious ceremonies must seek a legislative ex-
emption from criminal laws proscribing peyote use. 23' These less
popular religions may need to rely on political participation and
lobbying to a greater extent than more mainstream churches. By
limiting church-state interaction, the entanglement doctrine discrim-
inates against religions that embrace political activism. The entan-
glement doctrine contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence
prohibiting governmental discrimination among religions.
D. Summary
The entanglement test is inconsistent with constitutional prin-
ciples enunciated by the Supreme Court. By prohibiting active
religious involvement in politics, the entanglement doctrine con-
flicts with Supreme Court decisions recognizing rights to political
access. The entanglement doctrine also discriminates against reli-
See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HAxv. L. REv. 933, 961 (1989) (suggesting the possibility of "invidious
discrimination against minority religions"); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REy. 1, 40 (noting that members of minority faiths most often will
seek religious exemptions).
2 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-52 (1961) (finding Sunday closing
law constitutional).
2" The federal government even allowed the Catholic Church to use sacramental wine
during Prohibition. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 83, tit. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308
(1919).
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Compensation Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-
46 (1987) (reversing denial of unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-20 (1981) (reversing denial of unemployment compensation to a
pacifist who refused to work in an armaments plant).
231 See Employment Div. v. Smith, - U.S. -, - 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990) (noting that "a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for
sacramental peyote use").
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gions that embrace political activism-often small and nontradi-
tional sects. Finally, the entanglement prohibition on political
divisiveness is at odds with First Amendment protection accorded
political speech, even emotive and volatile political speech.
Under some circumstances, the conflict between the entangle-
ment doctrine and other constitutional principles might suggest a
need to harmonize divergent bodies of law. But, a restructuring of
First Amendment law to account for the entanglement doctrine
seems inappropriate. As indicated in Part I of this Article, the
Court never has identified clearly the values protected by, or the
contours of, the entanglement doctrine. Instead, this incongruence
between the vague entanglement doctrine and the firmly settled
tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence leads to only one conclu-
sion: The Court should abandon the entanglement- doctrine.
III. ALTERNATrvES TO ENTANGLEMENT
The concluding part of this Article considers three alternative
Establishment Clause theories that do not include the entanglement
test: (1) a secular purpose-primary effect model, (2) a coercion
model, and (3) a classification model. This part does not attempt
to develop a comprehensive Establishment Clause theory. 232 In-
stead, it seeks to identify some of the merits and drawbacks of
competing proposals. The following discussion evaluates the co-
herence of each alternative model and examines the compatibility
of each model with current Establishment Clause case law. Al-
though each model suffers from problems unresolved by this Ar-
ticle, each would improve Establishment Clause jurisprudence by
eliminating the unfortunate doctrine of entanglement.
A. A Secular Purpose-Primary Effect Model
Prior to the development of the entanglement doctrine, 233 Es-
tablishment Clause opinions employed only a two-part test. First,
the Court required a showing that some secular purpose supported
a challenged law. If the Court found a secular purpose, the Justices
then required the defendant to demonstrate that the principal or
23 For examples of such general constructs, see Choper, supra note 92, at 673; Daniel
0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rnv.
1113 (1988); McConnell, supra note 227.
"3 For a discussion of the evolution of the entanglement doctrine, see supra notes 8-
23 and accompanying text.
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primary effect of the law neither advanced nor inhibited religion.234
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,235 the Court changed to a three-part test
by adding the entanglement doctrine.
To return to its original two-part test, the Court need only
abandon the entanglement doctrine. Because only two decisions
have invalidated statutes solely for excessive entanglement 236 a
secular purpose-primary effect model would require little refor-
mulation of decided case law.
Nevertheless, a return to a secular purpose-primary effect model
probably is not desirable. Virtually no statute should violate the
deferential secular purpose test. The primary effect test, then,
would become the sole determinant of Establishment Clause valid-
ity. However, the primary effect test lacks the analytic content to
foster principled Establishment Clause decisions .27 The primary
effect' test also is inconsistent with some Free Exercise Clause
decisions.23
1. Secular Purpose
The secular purpose test involves deferential scrutiny of a gov-
ernment decision maker's motivations. 239 The test appears roughly
analogous to the rational basis scrutiny of equal'protection juris-
prudence, which considers whether a statute is "reasonable in light
of its purpose." Just as cases applying rational basis scrutiny
2-4 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
-5 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (invalidating a state program
that paid public school teachers to work in private schools); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-25
(invalidating supplementary salary payments made by the state to private school teachers).
Cases similar to Lemon and Aguilar have found that aid to religion constituted the "prin-
cipal or primary effect" of the challenged statute. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 384-98 (1985) (holding that the primary effect test was violated by the rental of
sectarian school classrooms by a public school); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-73
(1975) (holding that a state program paying public school personnel to provide counseling
and health testing services at sectarian schools has a primary effect of advancing religion).
The Court easily could recharacterize Aguilar and Lemon as primary effect holdings.
23 See infra part III.A.2.
23' See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
219 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (stating that laws violate the
secular purpose test only when "there [is] no question that the statute or activity [is]
motivated by wholly religious concerns"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983)
(stating that the secular purpose test is satisfied "when a plausible purpose for the State's
program may be discerned from the face of the statute").
SE.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HA.v. L. Ray. 1065, 1077-87 (1969).
[VOL. 80
ENTANGLEMENT
have deferred to plausible explanations of legitimate legislative
purpose, 241 the vast majority of Establishment Clause cases have
found some legitimate secular legislative purpose. 24 For example,
the Court obligingly has held that a municipality's Christian nativ-
ity scene served a secular purpose by illustrating the historic origins
of Christmas. 243 In upholding a federal law that opened public
school facilities to student religious groups, the Court found per-
suasive the secular purpose of preventing "discrimination against
religious and other types of speech." 2" The Court also has written
that state aid to sectarian schools is supported by the secular
purposes of "preserving a healthy and safe educational environ-
ment" for schoolchildren, 245 or maintaining private schools "as an
economic alternative to a wholly public [school] system."'
' "
In a few cases, the Court has exhibited less deference in apply-
ing the secular purpose test. In Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc. ,27
the Court held that no secular purpose supported a Connecticut
law that guarantied that Sabbath observers need not work on their
day of rest.m Though the law arguably furthered the secular goal
of economic efficiency, by eliminating employer-employee argu-
ments about Sabbath work, the Court did not recognize this pur-
pose. In Stone v. Graham,249 the Court found a lack of a secular
purpose for a Kentucky requirement that public schools post the
Ten Commandments in classrooms. 20 The Stone Court rejected
the state's secular purpose argument, which described the Com-
mandments as depicting "the fundamental legal code of Western
24, See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (upholding a
law that allowed only licensed ophthalmologists and optometrists to grind and replace
glasses lenses); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1949)
(allowing restrictive vehicle advertising laws).
242 See William B. Petersen, "A Picture Held Us Captive": Conceptual Confusion and
the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. Ray. 1827, 1845 (1989) (noting that "since the Court first
adopted the Lemon test, it has only twice invalidated a statute on the basis of purpose
criterion"); Simson, supra note 2, at 909 (stating that "unless a law is proven to be
predicated entirely on nonsecular purposes, [the purpose] requirement is met").
2-" See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. The Court failed to grapple with the fact that the
historic origins of Christmas are religious, not secular. This omission illustrates the defer-
ential nature of secular purpose review.
2" Board of Educ. v. Mergens, - US..... 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2371 (1990).
241 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
m Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754-55 (1976); see also
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality opinion).
2" 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
See Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708-11 (1985).
',, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
21 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980).
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Civilization and the Common Law of the United States. ' '2 1 Despite
the aberrational Caldor and Stone decisions, 2 2 the Court typically
applies the secular purpose test with great deference to legislative
motives.23
Under deferential scrutiny, creative counsel almost always can
conjure up a secular purpose for the challenged legislation. Thus,
the secular purpose test rarely will dictate Establishment Clause
resultsY 4 Under a two-part test, it is the second part, the primary
effect test, that would determine most Establishment Clause deci-
sions.
2. Primary Effect
Every law that benefits religion does not violate the Establish-
ment ClauseY 5 A municipality's construction of sidewalks or fund-
ing of fire fighting services will benefit churches located in the city.
But the Establishment Clause proscribes only laws that have the
"principal or primary effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. 6
A central flaw in the primary effect test is definitional. The
Court has failed to identify government action having "a principal
or primary effect" of advancing religion. For instance, the amount
of state funding provided to religious institutions is not determi-
native. In upholding tuition tax credits for parents of private school
students,257 and substantial non-categorical grants to sectarian col-
211 Id. at 41. A few years later, the Court accepted an almost identical statement of
secular purpose, and upheld municipal sponsorship of a Christmas nativity scene. See Lynch,
465 U.S. at 680-81 (holding that a Pawtucket, Rhode Island nativity scene illustrated the
historic origins of Christmas).
21 This is not to suggest that the Caldor and Stone Courts arrived at bad results. Even
if the statutes at issue in Stone and Caldor had survived secular purpose scrutiny, they
likely would have violated the primary effect test. For discussion of the primary effect test,
see infra part III.A.2.
2' But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-97 (1987) (holding that requiring
a balanced treatment of creationism and evolution lacks a secular purpose); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-61 (1985) (holding that an Alabama statute providing for a moment
of silence in the public schools lacked a secular purpose).
21 See Timu, supra note 144, § 14-9, at 1205 ("The definition of 'secular' here must
be a generous one."); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause
Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 83, 131 (1986) ("Most legislation has at least some secular
purpose.").
"I See, e.g., Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17
(1947); see also TamE, supra note 144, § 14-10, at 1215.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1981) (holding incidental benefits to
religion permissible); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
- See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-403.
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leges,28 the Court allowed significant public funding for sectarian
schools.2Y9 On the other hand, the primary effect test was violated
by a more modest program, under which a Michigan public school
district rented space in sectarian schools for enrichment courses
and community education.m
Nor does the character of state activities necessarily determine
whether a law will have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. The Court has held that a municipality's maintenance of
a Christmas nativity scene does not have the primary effect of
advancing religion.2 1 But a state program that provides secular
classroom materials to sectarian elementary and secondary schools
violates the primary effect test.m
The lack of any clear definition of the phrase "principal or
primary effect" invites a case-by-case interpretation. Though fact-
specific decision making is consistent with an analysis of degree
implicit in the primary effect test, the approach produces inconsis-
tent and unpredictable decisions seemingly unrelated to First
Amendment principles.
Decisions on government aid to sectarian schools support per-
suasive arguments against case-by-case interpretation of Establish-
ment Clause issues. In Wolman v. Walter,26 13 Establishment Clause
law reached an ebb. The Court's decision turned on minute and
seemingly arbitrary distinctions. In Wolman, the Court upheld
Ohio programs providing sectarian and private schools with text-
book loans, standardized testing, diagnostic programs, and thera-
peutic services, 264 but simultaneously struck down Ohio funding
for private school field trips and instructional materials.
26
The Wolman decision has received sharp criticism. 26 The spe-
cific factual distinctions emphasized by the Court greatly limit the
possible legislative responses to church-state issues. The absence of
21 See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-61.
21 Under the program upheld in Roemer, Maryland provided $1.7 million to private
colleges and universities in 1971. Id. at 743.
- See Ball, 473 U.S. at 384-98.
26, See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-83.
- See Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-66.
20 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 241-48.
See id. at 248-55.
See, e.g., id. at 264-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting); G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental
Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 785
(1978) ("The Supreme Court's distinctions in Wolman v. Walter are difficult to grasp and
even more difficult to defend.").
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any coherent principles will frustrate attempts to predict the judicial
response to new Establishment Clause questions.267 Most disturb-
ingly, decisions such as Wolman appear to overturn legislative
judgment on the basis of incoherent legal rules and subjective
preferences, rather than constitutional principles.
268
Additionally, the primary effect test conflicts with a number
of Free Exercise Clause decisions, including cases that authorize
religious exemptions. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 269 the Court exempted
Amish teenagers from a compulsory high school attendance law. 270
The primary effect of this exemption without question benefited
religion. Other than frustrating universal education, 271 the only
effect of the exemption was to benefit the Amish religion.272 Nev-
ertheless, the Court granted the exemption without addressing the
Establishment Clause or the primary effect test.273
Returning to a secular purpose-primary effect test would elim-
inate the constitutional problems posed by the entanglement doc-
trine. A secular purpose-primary effect model, however, does not
provide a principled or coherent method for deciding Establishment
Clause cases. Dissatisfaction with secular purpose-primary effect
analysis may in fact have led to the unfortunate introduction of
26 In addition, the lack of principles facilitates avoidance of precedent. For example,
the Court invalidated a state program that paid public school personnel to provide diagnostic
services to private school students in Meek but subsequently upheld a similar state program
in Wolman. A state program granting a tax deduction to parents who had paid private
school tuition was held unconstitutional in Nyquist, but the Court later upheld a similar
tax deduction in Mueller. But see Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-99 (asserting that the Nyquist
and Mueller programs included important differences).
16 See Choper, supra note 92, at 680 (criticizing the Court's ad hoc decisions); Simson,
supra note 2, at 908 (criticizing the Court's Establishment Clause tests); Evan M. Tager,
Note, The Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to Parochial Education, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 219, 234-35 (1984) (asserting that primary effect rulings "have become totally unpre-
dictable," but also suggesting that the Court could develop a coherent primary effect test).
-1 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2,0 See id. at 217-19. For a discussion of Yoder, see supra notes 101-05 and accom-
panying text.
2'1 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-29 (1972).
2 Free exercise cases that recognize rights to religious expression may have a similar
effect of advancing religion. See Mergens, - U.S. - , , 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-
73 (upholding a federal statute guarantying student religious groups access to high school
facilities); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-76 (prohibiting a state university's exclusion of religious
groups).
"I See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting a contradiction between religious exemptions and the primary effect test); Kurland,
supra note 2, at 17-18 (same).
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the entanglement doctrine. A return to the two-step analysis prob-
ably will generate little enthusiasm. 274
B. A Coercion Model
The coercion model prohibits only those government interac-
tions with religion likely to influence the religious beliefs of indi-
viduals. A number of First Amendment scholars have advocated
an Establishment Clause focus on coercive relationships. 275 Estab-
lishment Clause decisions have shown a marked sensitivity to
suggestions of religious coercion. For example, the Court in Stone
v. Graham held that posting the Ten Commandments in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause because the display might
"induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to
venerate and obey, the Commandments.
'276
Coercion concerns also may explain the Court's divergent treat-
ment of public prayer cases. In School District of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania and Maryland
laws requiring teachers to begin each public school day with a
prayer reading. 2" But in the subsequently decided Marsh v. Cham-
bers,278 the Court upheld a prayer reading at Nebraska legislative
sessions. 29 The Marsh Court observed: "Here, the individual [leg-
islator] claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not
readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' ... or peer pres-
sure."210
A coercion test is clearer and more predictable than a secular
purpose-primary effect model. Unlike the nebulous phrase "pri-
mary effect of advancing religion," the term "coercion" does
possess some definitional content. Under a coercion test, only
government relationships relating to religious indoctrination raise
Establishment Clause concerns.21
27 See Tager, supra note 268, at 226-27 (concluding that the Court's approach in
private school aid cases "betrays its general uneasiness with effect inquiry").
27 See Choper, supra note 92, at 675; McConnell, supra note 227, at 35; see also
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 933 (1986).
"' Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
2" See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212-27; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-36
(1962) (invalidating a voluntary public school prayer adopted by the State of New York).
-- 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
"I See id. at 786-95.
Id. at 792 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)).
"I Also, unlike a secular purpose-primary effect model, a coercion model could prove
consistent with religious exemptions that are mandated under the Free Exercise Clause. See
supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the appropriateness of a coercion model remains
highly debatable. Although the term "coercion" is capable of
definition, identifying church-state relationships likely to result in
religious coercion is a far more difficult matter.212 For example,
consider which of two statutes would have a more coercive effect.
The first statute authorizes public school teachers and students to
recite a brief voluntary prayer each day. The second funds a
Christmas nativity scene in a shopping district. The Court has
invalidated school prayer as a form of religious coercion, 3 while
upholding a nativity scene.2 However, Justices dissented from
both decisions, calling into question the Court's ability to divine
religious coercion.u5
Even if the Court could identify coercion with accuracy, the
test remains simplistic. Although the Establishment Clause un-
doubtedly should prevent religious coercion,286 proscribing coercion
does not necessarily represent the only purpose served by the
clause.287 State aid to sectarian schools does not involve appreciable
religious coercion. Families voluntarily choose sectarian schools as
an alternative to public education. Nonbelievers may take offense
when government uses tax monies to fund sectarian schools. But
such taxation does not coerce dissenters into joining a religion that
sponsors sectarian schools.
Despite the absence of overt coercion, government funding of
religious schools may raise Establishment Clause concerns. Oppo-
m See Choper, supra note 92, at 700 (stating that a coercion test requires "a number
of delicate, factual judgments"); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause:
The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Rav. 555, 577
(1991) ("Once one gets beyond the obvious case of dire threats-your prayers or your life-
there remain knotty problems of whether coercion attends conditioning government benefits
upon participation or passive acquiescence in religious ceremony.").
2 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226; Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-36.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
2s See id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing nativity scene as "a coercive,
though perhaps small, step toward establishing the sectarian preferences of the majority at
the expense of the minority"); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating
that the government has no duty to insulate public school children from any awareness of
religion); Engel, 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that a voluntary school
prayer does not "interfered with the free exercise of anybody's religion").
" See Ball, 473 U.S. at 385 (stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits indoctri-
nation); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973)
(same).
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786 ("The absence of any element of coercion, however,
is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause."); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430
("[T]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion .... ).
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sition to the funding of religions through taxation provided strong
support for the adoption of the Establishment Clause.288 In addi-
tion, Establishment Clause concerns may follow from the endorse-
ment of religion that accompanies sectarian school funding.s 9
C. A Classification Model
A third approach to Establishment Clause analysis adopts the
equal protection jurisprudence focus on statutory classifications. m
This model prohibits government use of legislative classifications
that distinguish between different religions, or between religion and
nonreligion. Also, the use of a nonreligious classification would
violate the Establishment Clause, if this classification were moti-
vated by a desire to favor or persecute certain religions. 291
Some Establishment Clause decisions appear entirely consistent
with a classification model. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the
Court struck down a Connecticut statute benefiting Sabbath ob-
servers.292 The Connecticut law provided: "No person who states
2n See Choper, supra note 92, at 677 ("The practice perceived by the Framers as
perhaps the most serious infringement of religious liberty sought to be corrected by the
Establishment Clause was forcing the people to support religion by the use of compulsory
taxes for purely sectarian purposes."). See generally JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE CompIxI MADISON 299, 300 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1953).
29 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (noting that recent
Court opinions scrutinize statutes for religious endorsement); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Establishment Clause should proscribe "gov-
erment endorsement or disapproval of religion"); Tager, supra note 268, at 222-23 (stating
that "government should not place its imprimatur on religion"). Government aid to private
schools might appear as an endorsement of the Catholic Church because the church sponsors
such a high percentage of private schools. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406 (noting that
84% of the private school students aided by a New York City program attended Catholic
schools); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 234 (noting that 92% of Ohio students enrolled in private
schools attended Catholic affiliated schools).
"0 On equal protection analysis generally, see JEaomaE A. BAreoN ET AL., CoNsrrru-
TiONAL LAw: PumclPLxs AND Poulcy 471-72 (1987); TamE, supra note 144, § 16-1, at 1436-
54; Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrines on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rv.
1, 8-10, 15-20 (1972); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 343-65 (1949).
29, Proponents of such a classification model include Professor John Hart Ely and
Professor Philip Kurland. See John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1314 (1970); Philip Kurland, Of Church and State
and Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961); see also Gail Merel, The Protection
of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment,
45 U. Cm. L. Ra,. 805, 829 (1978); Paulsen, supra note 23, at 312-15.
m See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 706.
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that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may
be required by his employer to work on such day." 293 This Con-
necticut statute explicitly classified on the basis of religious belief.
Only Sabbath observers could refuse to work on a particular week-
day.
The Court held that this Connecticut statute violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. 294 Some of the Caldor Court's reasoning is
difficult to understand, 295 but the Court's invalidation of the Con-
necticut statute is consistent with a classification model of the
Establishment Clause. As Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion
concluded: "This unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observ-
ers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of
the Religion Clauses ... ."29
The Court also has invalidated some statutes resulting from
religious motivations, even though these statutes did not incorpo-
rate explicit religious classifications. In Wallace, the Court struck
down an Alabama statute that authorized public schools to observe
a one minute period of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer.' '297 The Wallace decision reviewed the legislative history of
the moment of silence statute,298 concluding that Alabama legisla-
tors had intended "to return prayer to the public schools" 29 in
spite of prior Supreme Court decisions prohibiting school prayer. 3°°
As two concurring opinions explicitly noted, the Wallace decision
did not hold that all moment of silence statutes would violate the
Establishment Clause.310 Instead, the decision only held that the
2' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303(e) (1985).
24 See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 708-11.
29 The Court also attacked the statute because it imposed an "absolute duty" on
employers to facilitate employee Sabbath observance and because the law made no allowance
for "special circumstances." Id. at 709. The Court thus seemed to suggest that a more
qualified Sabbath exemption might be constitutional. A qualified Sabbath exemption might
make greater sense as a matter of public policy, but it is difficult to understand why the
absolute or qualified nature of the exemption should make any difference for Establishment
Clause purposes. See McConnell, supra note 227, at 56 (stating that the absolute nature of
the Caldor accommodation "is of dubious relevance under the establishment clause");
Paulsen, supra note 23, at 337 n.115 (stating that Caldor "is as incomprehensible as its
opinion is slight").
2"6 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
See id. at 57-59.
" Id. at 59.
"I See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-27; Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-36.
311 See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 67-76 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
One other challenge to a moment of silence statute has reached the Court. The Court
dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77-83 (1987).
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particular statute in question was motivated by an unlawful in-
tent. 302 Thus, Wallace is also consistent with the classification ap-
proach.
The Court often has written that preventing discrimination on
the basis of religious belief constitutes a core purpose of the
Establishment Clause, 30 3 and this reading seems intuitively plausi-
ble. Without question, government may provide religions with the
same fire protection, road maintenance, and general public services
received by nonreligious institutions.304 On the other hand, serious
Establishment Clause problems result from government funding of
a special bus service carrying believers to church,305 or a rule
exempting only religions from property taxes °.3 16 Establishment
Clause concerns often arise when government treats religions dif-
ferently from other organizations, through use of a religious clas-
sification.
On the other hand, a classification model conflicts with Free
Exercise Clause cases. 307 In Yoder, where the Court exempted Amish
students from compulsory high school attendance, the Court relied
on an explicit religious classification. Non-Amish students were not
exempted from compulsory high school attendance, even if such
attendance imposed hardships. Because this third model prohibits
religious classifications, this model seems inconsistent with religious
exemptions. 30 8
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 59.
3 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
3' See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
10 See Buchanan, supra note 266, at 793-94.
306 The Court upheld a New York City rule that exempted houses of worship from
property taxes, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan argued that the rule was constitutional because New York had granted the
tax exemption to a variety of charitable organizations. Justice Harlan thus concluded: "I
can see no lack of neutrality in extending the benefit of the exemption to organized religion."
Id. at 697.
The holdings in these free exercise cases also conflict with a secular purpose-primary
effect model. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
31 See Kurland, supra note 2, at 16; Merel, supra note 291, at 807. A classification
model may not foreclose all religious exemptions. For example, the Equal Protection Clause
proscribes all racial classifications that burden minorities, but allows the use of explicit
racial classifications in some programs designed to benefit minorities. See, e.g., Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, .. _U.S. - , - , 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-28 (1990) (up-
holding a FCC affirmative action program). By analogy, a classification model could
authorize religious exemptions when such classifications benefit minority religious groups.
See Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point, 1966 WIs.
L. Ray. 217, 288; Steinberg, supra note 91, at 102-38; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging
Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEo. L.J. 1691, 1713 (1988).
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Reliance on a classification model also involves practical dif-
ficulties. First, courts need to identify those statutes resulting from
improper religious motivations. Identifying legislative motivation is
a notoriously difficult taskY°9 The motivations of any individual
government decision maker may prove difficult to identify, and
legislative bodies rely on the votes of numerous individuals to adopt
a statute. Enactment usually results from multiple motivations.
310
Even in cases where government action clearly results from
religious motivations, classification analysis may not yield a clear
Establishment Clause answer. The Court might review religious
classifications under a "strict scrutiny" standard, similar to the
strict scrutiny that applies in racial discrimination cases. 31 Under
strict scrutiny analysis, the Court would invalidate any religious
classification, unless the government demonstrated that the classi-
fication was necessary to achieve a "compelling governmental in-
terest." 31
2
Adoption of strict scrutiny review would require very significant
changes in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Strict
scrutiny, as traditionally applied, would invalidate such familiar
practices as prayer readings prior to government meetings, 3 3 the
printing of the phrase "In God We Trust" on United States
currency,314 and the recognition of Christmas as an official holi-
30 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (describing some of the
difficulties in ascertaining legislative motivation); Petersen, supra note 242, at 1834-40
(arguing that the Court should not rely on analysis of legislative motives in Establishment
Clause cases). But see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Ray. 95, 119-24 (arguing that courts often will be
able to determine the motivation of a government decision maker).
110 See. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) ("What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others
to enact it.. . ."). On some of the difficulties faced by courts attempting to discern
legislative motives, see generally Brest, supra note 309, at 119-30 (questioning the difficulty
of determining legislative intent); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit
Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 114-17 (1977)
(questioning the persuasiveness of objections to motive analysis).
"I See generally Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-87 (1982)
(employing strict scrutiny in equal protection analysis); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is pre-
sumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon extraordinary justification.").
312 Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (finding no compelling governmental
interest); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (same).
3" The Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska practice of beginning legislative sessions
with a prayer reading in Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-95.
314 Cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 (suggesting that the inscription "In God We Trust" on
United States currency raises no constitutional problem); Aronow v. United States, 432
F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that phrase "In God We Trust" does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
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day.315 Although the Court has unconvincingly attempted to for-
mulate some secular purpose resulting in these government actions,
'3 1 6
these familiar practices all involve government recognition of cer-
tain religious beliefs and exercises. None of these practices furthers
a compelling governmental interest independent of religious prac-
tices.
In an attempt to reconcile precedent with a classification model,
the Court could apply some form of intermediate scrutiny to
religious classifications. In other words, the Court could require
that religious classifications "serve important governmental objec-
tives and ... be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.1 317 Under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review,
religiously motivated government programs that serve important
government objectives would be permissible.
Intermediate scrutiny review would allow the Court's precedent
to harmonize with a classification model. Intermediate scrutiny,
however, would involve markedly less predictability and certainty
than strict scrutiny. Instead, intermediate scrutiny review would
result in rulings as unpredictable as the decisions produced by a
primary effect analysis.
318
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked reluctance to
reevaluate Establishment Clause doctrine. One commentator has
criticized the use of a "standard profile," with the Court mechan-
M' Cf. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 ("[IThe government may acknowledge Christmas as
a cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment it may not observe it as a Christian
holy day .... "); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 (noting that Congress has recognized Christmas
as an official holiday and has excused federal employees from work on Christmas).
316 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 (finding the illustration of the historical origins of Christmas
through a public nativity scene to be a secular purpose); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (finding
continuance of tradition of legislative prayer to be a. secular purpose).
317 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny in
equal protection analysis).
3 The Court has applied an intermediate scrutiny test in cases alleging gender discrim-
ination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law
that has developed in gender discrimination cases is anything but clear and predictable.
Compare Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-63 (1981) (invalidating a Louisiana law
that gave husbands the unilateral ability to dispose of marital property) and Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho law that preferred males in the assignment
of an estate administrator) with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-83 (1981) (upholding
a federal law that required only men to register for military conscription) and Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (upholding an Alabama decision to hire only male
prison guards to work in all-male maximum security prisons).
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ically applying precedent rather than exploring the unique church-
state relationship at issue in each new Establishment Clause case. 19
Another author has complained of the Court's refusal to reconcile
"corrosive precedents," resulting in Establishment Clause distinc-
tions lacking any fundamental integrity.
320
The Court's allegiance to the entanglement doctrine is consis-
tent with this refusal to reevaluate Establishment Clause con-
cepts. 321 The entanglement doctrine has received both caustic
criticism from religion clause scholars 3 2 and attacks from some
of the Justices themselves. 323 After more than twenty years, the
Court still has developed no clear method for divining when a
church-state relationship involves unconstitutional administrative
entanglement. And, although the entanglement doctrine also pro-
scribes government programs suggesting a potential for "political
division along religious lines," ' 324 the Court has avoided any serious
attempt to give specific content to this phrase.
325
If the entanglement doctrine represented nothing more than a
manipulable test that masked other Court reasoning, the continued
invocation of the doctrine might not seem terribly disturbing. But
the entanglement doctrine directly conflicts both with well-estab-
lished First Amendment principles and with constitutional rights to
political participation. The Court typically has resolved this conflict
by ignoring the entanglement doctrine in certain cases. Yet, this
intermittent reliance on the entanglement doctrine only has added
39 See Ripple, supra note 1, at 1221; see also id. at 1222 ("In effect, characterizations
previously given certain religious institutions or certain religious-civil relationships in earlier
cases became presumptively conclusive.").
... See Buchanan, supra note 266, at 783-84; see also id. at 818 (arguing that court
decisions assessing aid to sectarian schools have not developed any "durable [F]irst
[A]mendment philosophy").
3' In the pending Lee v. Weisman case, Solicitor General Kenneth H. Starr has invited
the Justices to reevaluate current Establishment Clause law. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (May 1991) (pending
before the Supreme Court) (copy on file with the author). For a discussion of the Lee v.
Weisman litigation, see supra note 3.
322 See supra note 2.
32 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 767-70 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
324 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
31 See Kurland, supra note 2, at 20 ("The word entanglement is only an antonym for
separation. The former assures no more guidance than the latter."); Ripple, supra note 1,
at 1224 ("In re-evaluating the entanglement test, the Court will have to confront the reality
that despite a decade of experience, it has yet to find a satisfactory internal discipline which
will curb excessive judicial subjectivity.").
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to its vague character, and to the lack of clarity in Establishment
Clause law.
The third part of this Article proposes three alternative Estab-
lishment Clause models that do not incorporate any concept of
entanglement. Given the complex problems raised by church-state
relationships, none of these models provides a simple solution to
all Establishment Clause issues. Consistent use of one of these
models, however, could improve the coherence of church-state
decisions. Regardless of the ultimate choice, principled Establish-
ment Clause adjudication will be possible only after the Court
abandons the entanglement doctrine.

